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Article 9

RECENT CASE NOTES
Feed Co., 9 Ind. App. 251, 36 N. E. 352; PittsburghEtc. Co. v. Marable, 81
Ind. App. 46, 140 N. E. 443 (also 189 Ind. 278). The right of an employee
to recover additional compensation for service rendered at the request of
his employers depends on the existence of a contract to that effect, either
express or implied. PittsburghEtc. Co. v. Marable, supra; PittsburghEtc.
Co. v. Baker, 73 Ind. App. 332, 125 N. E. 233. Somewhat different from this
case is that of Pittsburgh Etc. Co. v. Henderson, 9 Ind. App. 480, 36 N. E.
376, where recovery was allowed in the absence of express contract where
such services were not in line of the regular duty of the employee.
It would seem that the obligation to pay for the services had been completely discharged by the payment of the amount to the employee and there
is an accord and satisfaction of the debt, and there is nothing upon which
to base an implied-in-fact contract. From the facts of the instant case, it
would seem that it is wholly in accord with previous Indiana decisions.
A. W. E.
NEGLIGENCE-PROxIMATE CAusE-Plaintiff was riding as a guest in a
car which was being driven south over a bridge at a speed of from fifteen
to twenty-five miles per hour towards a switch crossing maintained by defendant about fifteen feet from the south end of the bridge. It was a dark
and rainy night and electric lights on the bannisters of the bridge so
"glared" and blinded the driver that he was unable to see defendant's train
standing on the crossing until he was about twenty or twenty-five feet from
it when he applied his brakes but could not avoid hitting the cars whereby
plaintiff received the injuries complained of. The cars had been standing
on the crossing for three minutes while defendant's employees were engaged
in a necessary operation of the train. There was a verdict and judgment
for plaintiff in the trial court from which defendant appeals. Held, reversed, with instructions to sustain appellant's motion for a new trial;
Remy, J., dissenting. When automobile driver could not stop after lights
made train visible, the blocking of the crossing was not the proximate cause
of plaintiff's injuries. Cleveland, C. C. & St. Louis Ry. Co. v. Gillespie,
App. Court of Indiana, June 27, 1930, 172 N. E. 131.
In ruling upon the question of proximate cause the court seems to have
decided a point which it was not necessary to decide. There is a confusion
of the questions of negligence with the question of proximate cause and
contributory negligence.
The reported opinion is very unsatisfactory and is inconsistent in its
discussion of the problems involved. In the beginning of the opinion the
court says, "The allegations are not sufficient to allege a violation of section 2903." (Sec. 2903, Burns' 1926, imposes a fine for permitting or suffering a freight train or any car or engine thereof to remain standing
across any public highway, or when it becomes necessary to stop such train
across any public highway, for failure to leave a space of sixty feet across
such highway.) It would seem to be unnecessary to decide whether or not
defendant was guilty of a violation of the statute. But, after remarking
upon principles of common law negligence and giving a resum6 of the evidence, the court returns to this point, and, citing cases, apparently decides
the point which was said not to be raised by the allegations.
Proceeding then to a discussion of the common law principles involved,
the court defines proximate cause, holds as a matter of law, that the driver
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was negligent and apparently decides that there was no negligence on the
part of the defendant by saying, "The evidence presents a situation, as far
as appellant is concerned, of furnishing a condition unattendedby negligence
on its part, by which the injury to appellee was caused by the subsequent
independent act of Usher (the driver), and, in such case, the existence of
the condition was not the proximate cause of appellee's injuries." If there
was no negligence on the part of the defendant, and no violation of a statutory duty, the question of proximate cause was clearly not involved. The
question of proximate cause necessarily does not arise in the absence of
a breach of duty on the part of the defendant which could be the proximate
cause of the plaintiff's injuries. If there is no breach of duty by the defendant there is consequently nothing upon which its liability can be predicated. Green, Rationale of Proximate Cause, Ch. 1, Sec. 3. If, however, it
be found that there was negligence the question of proximate cause must
then be determined. This question could not be disposed of by saying that
the driver was guilty of contributory negligence. The negligence of the
driver cannot be imputed to the plaintiff. Baltimore & Ohio R. Co. v. Fanbion, 170 N. E. 94 (Appellate Court of Indiana, Feb. 26, 1930), and where
two causes combine to produce injuries, defendant is not relieved of liability because he is responsible for only one of such causes. Sarber v. City of
Indianapolis, 126 N. E. 330.
The closing statement of the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Remy,
"Whether, under the evidence in this case, the trainmen exercised reasonable or ordinary care in blocking the highway for three minutes without
warning travelers on the highway was, in my opinion, a question of fact
for the jury, likewise the question as to the proximate cause of appellee's
injuries," seems to be a most accurate analysis of the problem involved.
S. J.S.
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PROXIMATE CAusE-Appellee, a child of five years, was sent by X to appellant's filling station to purchase a quart of gasoline, and was given a glass
jar of quart capacity in which to procure same. Employee of appellant
filled said jar with gasoline, delivered it into custody of the child, and cautioned her to carry it in an upright position. While returning to the home
of X, appellee fell, broke the jar, and cut her hand and wrist on the broken
glass. Complaint alleged that the gasoline burned and cauterized the
wounds, and that appellant was negligent in delivering a caustic, dangerous substance into the custody of a child, knowing it to be such. Held,
Judgment on verdict for plaintiff reversed. Indian Refining Co. v. Summerland, Appellate Court of Indiana, July 2, 1930, 172 N. E. 129.
Appellant contended that the complaint on its face showed that the
proximate cause of the injury was the negligence of X in sending appellee
on said errand with the jar in question. But one negligent person cannot
escape liability for his negligence because negligence of another concurred
in producing the injury. Louisville, New Albany and Chicago Railway Co.
v. Lucas, 119 Ind. 583. If the defendant's negligence concurs with that of
another, or with an act of God, and becomes a part of the direct-and proximate cause of the injury, although not the sole cause, the defendant is
liable. This doctrine is well established. Watts v. Evansville, Mt. Carmel
& Northern Railway, 191 Ind. 27. Thus the appellant cannot escape liabil-

